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INTRODUCTION1
Wal- Mart is a behemoth. The retail giant has garnered greater annual 
revenues than any other firm for seven of the last ten years. And with 2.2 
million employees, it has about as many people in uniform as the People’s 
Liberation Army of China. The enormity of Wal- Mart’s operations has 
made the company the focus of much attention from journalists and 
scholars alike. In particular, the social effects of its model of ‘everyday 
low prices’, in which very cheap products are sold in very high volumes, 
have been hotly debated. Economic geographers, labour historians, busi-
ness analysts, neoclassical economists and sociologists have all weighed 
in on the discussions (cf. Basker 2007; Bianco 2006; Gereffi and Christian 
2009, Lichtenstein 2006). While some have pointed to the savings that 
Wal- Mart offers to cash- strapped consumers, others have sought to high-
light the deleterious effects Wal- Mart’s cost- cutting strategies have on 
its own employees, on local communities and on the workers that toil in 
 sweatshop conditions for Wal- Mart’s suppliers.
Much of the research done on Wal- Mart is very instructive for those 
who seek to make sense of the company. However, what all of the analy-
ses appear to lack is a systematic quantitative means of actually gauging 
the changes in Wal- Mart’s power. And without a clear conception of 
Wal- Mart’s power trajectory, it is difficult to make sense of the wider 
significance of the insights that existing analyses offer. This chapter seeks 
to make up for this deficiency by drawing on, and developing, aspects of 
the capital as power (CasP) framework propounded by Jonathan Nitzan 
and Shimshon Bichler. The CasP framework offers a method of analys-
ing relations of control and resistance as they redound across every social 
1 The impetus for this research project was sparked by a post by D.T. Cochrane enti-
tled ‘Wal- Mart: Stagnant since 1999’ on the forum page of capitalaspower.com. I am very 
grateful to Cochrane and Jonathan Nitzan for their invaluable support at every stage of the 
research and writing of this chapter.
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scale (Nitzan and Bichler 2009). As Nitzan and Bichler argue, these dis-
parate and heterogeneous power dynamics can be empirically investigated 
because their effects are encoded into the universal metric of capital.
This chapter explores Wal- Mart’s power trajectory with reference to 
the company’s relationship with labour. More specifically, it examines 
how dynamics of control and resistance between Wal- Mart and workers 
employed within Wal- Mart stores have impacted the pecuniary develop-
ment of the company. The argument is divided into three sections. The 
first section elaborates on the CasP approach and demonstrates how it can 
help the researcher chart the development of Wal- Mart’s power in the last 
four decades. The second section seeks to make sense of this power tra-
jectory by offering a new quantitative measure of the company’s relative 
control over its workers. Moreover, I draw on some qualitative analyses 
of the growing resistance Wal- Mart has faced within the US. The third 
section surveys Wal- Mart’s attempts to spread its operations in ‘human 
resource complexes’ abroad to compensate for declining differential earn-
ings in the US (Harvey 2006: 399). As I show, the retail behemoth has been 
encumbered by labour resistance in many of its foreign ventures, just as it 
has been encumbered in the US.
CAPITAL AS POWER
The CasP framework suggests that capital is the central power institution 
of contemporary society. But how is this power measured? Nitzan and 
Bichler point to capitalization, the formula through which risk- adjusted 
future earnings are discounted to their present value. As the first chapter 
of any corporate finance textbook testifies, this formula constitutes the 
generative grammar for the language of business. Nitzan and Bichler’s 
theoretical innovation lies in recasting the discounting formula from the 
perspective of what they call ‘dominant capital’: the major firms and gov-
ernment entities at the core of the accumulation process. Capitalization is 
all- encompassing. Any social process that may bear on the future earnings 
of any given asset is factored into the capitalization formula. And since 
dominant capital actively seeks to shape and re- shape social processes in 
a manner that augments future income and curbs risk, capitalization is 
itself the central algorithm of business power. This insight has far- reaching 
implications. Instead of being a mere tool that enables owners to reac-
tively measure the value of their ownership claims, capitalization is the 
means through which dominant capital appraises its capacity to actively 
restructure society in ways that boost future earnings and reduce volatility 
(Nitzan and Bichler 2009).
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Moreover, from the CasP perspective, power is not an entity itself. Just 
as force only exists where there is counter- force, power presupposes resist-
ance. As such, power should be understood in relative rather than absolute 
terms. This relativity has both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. 
On the quantitative side, it is indicated by the fact that corporations do 
not seek to reach a conceptually indeterminate ‘profit maximum’. Instead 
they benchmark their own performance in relation to an average. On the 
qualitative side, it is indicated by the fact that different groups of corpo-
rations constantly seek to transform the manifold institutions of social 
order, against resistance, so as to augment their power over and above 
other business groups. Thus, capitalized power is manifest in its redis-
tributional effects. Nitzan and Bichler call the quantitative dynamic of 
power redistribution between corporate groupings differential accumula-
tion. By conducting a quantitative–qualitative analysis of the dynamics of 
differential accumulation on the one hand and the contested processes of 
institutional restructuring on the other, the researcher can begin to map 
out transformations in the power of dominant capital over society (Nitzan 
and Bichler 2009).
With the bare essentials of the CasP theory outlined, we can now begin 
to trace the power trajectory of Wal- Mart. Figure 9.1 offers the starting 
point of the analysis. It depicts the firm’s differential capitalization and 
differential profit as set against the average corporation within dominant 
capital, both plotted against a logarithmic scale. The proxy I use for 
dominant capital is the Compustat 500 – the 500 largest firms by market 
capitalization listed in the US. Two major observations can be made from 
the chart. First, the differential capitalization and differential profit of 
Wal- Mart are very tightly correlated. This strong correlation underlines 
the importance of understanding current earnings as driving the long- term 
increases in the capitalization of the company.
Secondly and most importantly, the figure gives a very good insight into 
the differential trajectory of Wal- Mart. In 1975, the market capitalization 
of Wal- Mart was just one- tenth of the average firm in dominant capital. 
But in less than two decades the relative capitalization increases almost 
one- hundredfold, so that by 1993 Wal- Mart’s capitalization is over nine 
times larger than the average dominant capitalist firm. The period from 
the late 1970s to the early 1990s thus represents a true golden age for Wal- 
Mart. However, from the early 1990s onwards Wal- Mart’s capitalization 
has just been growing more or less at the same pace as the average firm 
within dominant capital. As such, it appears that the retail behemoth has 
reached a differential ceiling.
In what remains I investigate why Wal- Mart appears to be reaching 
a differential ceiling by linking a qualitative appraisal of Wal- Mart’s 
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 development to a quantitative analysis of the company’s relative profit 
growth. Now according to Nitzan and Bichler, the differential accu-
mulation of dominant capital as a whole is achieved primarily through 
mergers and acquisitions and price rises. Moreover, these two regimes 
of differential accumulation have become increasingly countercyclical. 
However, for much of Wal- Mart’s history, the key propellants of its 
pecuniary development have been cost- cutting and greenfield investment. 
And rather than operating counter- cyclically, they operate in a coeval and 
symbiotic manner. This self- reinforcing dynamic between cost- cutting 
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Figure 9.1  The differential capitalization and differential net profit of 
Wal- Mart
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and greenfield investment is explained by the fact that Wal- Mart can only 
control its workers if it is large enough to reshape local labour markets in 
the ways it deems necessary; and it can only exert meaningful pressure on 
manufacturers if it can promise, in return for low supplier prices, access to 
a significant portion of US consumers.
Such a relationship between Wal- Mart’s political economies of scale 
on the one hand, and control over labour and supply chains on the other, 
gave rise to a ‘virtuous cycle’ of profit growth in which high sales volume 
finances low- margin pricing and low- margin pricing drives high sales 
volume. In the next section I show how the virtuous cycle propelled Wal- 
Mart’s rapid ascent in the 1970s and 1980s. In the section after that, I 
show how the symbiosis between cost- cutting and greenfield investment 
has become less and less effective as Wal- Mart has become larger in size 
and as it has encountered more and more resistance. In order to continue 
accumulating differentially, Wal- Mart will either have to engage in infla-
tionary price increases and thus betray its founding retail principle of 
‘everyday low prices’ or it will have to conduct more cross- border mergers 
and acquisitions. As I argue in the last section, the evidence so far suggests 
that Wal- Mart is principally opting for the latter strategy, but with mixed 
success.
THE CONTESTED DEVELOPMENT OF WAL- MART 
IN THE UNITED STATES
Wal- Mart’s Golden Age of Accumulation: 1960s to Mid- 1990s
Wal- Mart’s model of lean retailing took shape in its early development 
during the 1960s in Bentonville, in Northwest Arkansas. At that time, 
agricultural production was getting belatedly mechanized in these rural 
backwaters and this caused the displacement of tens of thousands of 
workers from the region’s farmland. In this context, Wal- Mart was able 
to draw upon surfeits of cheap labour (Lichtenstein 2006). And the com-
pany’s founder, Sam Walton, wanted to keep things this way. Unlike the 
executives of other retail giants, such as Kmart and Sears, which accom-
modated unionization in the post- war era, Walton took a zero- tolerance 
approach to organized labour. He viewed unions as an intrusion upon 
managerial control and an impediment to his hallmark cost- cutting 
strategy. While the first reason for Walton’s anti- unionism was perhaps 
born out of his idiosyncratic paternalism, the second reason had a 
more direct pecuniary logic. The retail business is very labour- intensive. 
Supermarkets, for example, pay as much as 70 per cent of their  operating 
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budget on labour costs (Lichtenstein 2009: 135). Thus, the benefits that 
Wal- Mart accrued from keeping wages low by keeping unions out were 
significant. Wal- Mart’s animus towards unions was manifest in the 
geography of the company’s early expansion. For the first two decades 
of its existence, Wal- Mart built almost all of its stores in small towns in 
the south- east and midwest where organized labour has historically been 
weak. It largely avoided the ‘archipelago’ of union strongholds stretching 
from the District of Columbia to the metropolitan areas of New York, 
Boston, Minneapolis, Seattle and San Diego (Lichtenstein 2009).
Wal- Mart expanded through small- town America through a process of 
market saturation: gaining commercial dominance in one region and then 
moving onto the next. With this market saturation strategy in place, Wal- 
Mart expanded its retail dominion throughout rural America virtually 
unimpeded. By the end of the 1980s the company became the third largest 
retailer in the US, even though it operated in only half of the American 
states (Vance and Scott 1994). Wal- Mart was almost becoming a vast 
state in itself. It even developed its own nomenclature. The company’s pre-
cariously employed workers were christened ‘associates’; the company’s 
human resources department was termed ‘the People Division’; the com-
pany’s founding father was known by the sentimental moniker ‘Mr Sam’ 
and his multimillionaire directors were named, in true Orwellian fashion, 
‘Servant Leaders’. The firm went so far as to invent its own rallying cry – 
‘the Wal- Mart Cheer’ – that its retail clerks and shelf stackers are still 
expected to sing with gusto at the beginning of every morning shift (Vance 
and Scott 1994; Lichtenstein 2009).
However, it would be wrong to attribute Wal- Mart’s early pecuniary 
success solely to the corporation’s own agency. There were political- 
economic developments beyond the company’s control that had a sig-
nificant bearing on its pecuniary trajectory. For one thing, the decline of 
organized labour in the US was highly propitious for Wal- Mart’s expan-
sion. Indeed, although Wal- Mart avoided a head- on clash with unions 
partly because of its rural location strategy, the company also benefited 
from the fact that the morale of union organizers within the retail sector 
was sapped by a series of defeats suffered by the American labour move-
ment as a whole. Chief among these defeats was the failed passage of the 
Labour Law Reform Act in 1978 and Reagan’s hugely symbolic quashing 
of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization strike in 1981 
(Lichtenstein 2009). Against this backdrop of union retrenchment, Wal- 
Mart was enjoying relative pliancy from its workers.
Moreover, the declining role that the manufacturing sector in the US 
has played in the generation of income in the US coincided with the 
increasing significance of service industries. This shift has been accompa-
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nied by a profound transformation in American society: the feminization 
of labour. On the one hand, this transformation is reflected in the massive 
influx of women into paid work, with employment rates of adult females 
shooting up from 48 per cent in 1973 to over 67 per cent in 1997 (Richard 
B. Freeman 2000: 5). On the other hand, the transformation is constitu-
tive of the degradation of wage labour along lines associated with the 
subordinate gender roles of women. Indeed, the burgeoning service sector 
has opened up a new segment of the labour market characterized by more 
casualized, more ‘flexible’ and less secure work. Women in general, and 
women from ethnic minorities in particular, became disproportionately 
represented in these new jobs. Wal- Mart capitalized on this process, and 
at the same time reinforced it, by filling its lowest labour ranks with pre-
dominantly female workers, while keeping its managerial staff overwhelm-
ingly male. In fact, from the company’s foundation, around 70 per cent of 
its low- ranking employees have been female. Yet even to this day women 
receive far less pay for the same work that their male counterparts carry 
out, and they only gain around one- third of all promotions to managerial 
positions (Seligman 2006: 237). As such, hierarchical social relationships 
outside of Wal- Mart stores have been reproduced and reaffirmed within 
them.
The company’s initial success in marrying worker discipline and wage 
repression is registered in Wal- Mart’s changing differential selling and 
general administration (SGA) expenses per employee as presented in 
Figure 9.2. This measure calibrates the relative efficiency of Wal- Mart’s 
internal operations and thus can be seen as a rough proxy of the company’s 
differential control over its workers. The data are weighted relative to the 
corresponding SGA expenses per employee of the average firm within the 
Compustat 500. Thus, we can surmise that the lower the indicator gets, 
the more intensively Wal- Mart is projecting its power on its employees 
relative to dominant capital as a whole. In measuring Wal- Mart’s cost- 
cutting performance in this manner we can build a richer understanding of 
the differential profit and differential capitalization data presented in the 
previous section.
Figure 9.2 clearly shows how Wal- Mart dramatically reduced its rela-
tive internal expenses in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1970 Wal- Mart’s SGA 
expenses per employee were 17 per cent higher than the average firm in 
dominant capital, but twenty years later they were 60 per cent lower than 
the average. This massive drop in Wal- Mart’s relative internal expenses 
testifies to the early success of Wal- Mart’s disciplinary control over its 
workforce. The company’s sales motif of everyday low prices was under-
girded by a ruthless regimen of everyday low labour costs (Roberts and 
Berg 2012).
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The Mid- 1990s Onward: Wal- Mart’s Differential Accumulation Model 
Runs into Limits
By the late- 1980s Wal- Mart had enveloped much of rural America. And 
by the early 1990s Wal- Mart had come to dominate the discount sector 
along with its two major rivals Kmart and Sears. As such, there was little 
room for Wal- Mart’s continued expansion within its existing pecuniary 
ambit, both in sectoral and geographical terms. Wal- Mart began to extend 
its business interests from rural to metropolitan areas, and from non- food 
retailing to food retailing. However, by extending its dominion in this 
manner, Wal- Mart was impinging on the territorial domains of its retail 
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Note: Wal- Mart’s SGA expenses per employee are weighted relative to the corresponding 
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Figure 9.2 The differential cost- cutting of Wal- Mart
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rivals. Moreover, by entering the union strongholds in the north- east and 
the west coast, it was also setting itself on a collision course with organ-
ized labour. The over one million strong United Food and Commercial 
Workers (UFCW) union was particularly keen to defend existing workers 
within the grocery sector against the outgrowth of Wal- Mart’s lean 
 retailing model (Lichtenstein 2009; Roberts and Berg 2012).
Wal- Mart continued expanding into grocery retailing and by 2001 it 
had become the largest food retailer in the US. During this period of rapid 
expansion, the company sought to quash the intensified union threat by 
ramping up surveillance of its employees. Wal- Mart installed a nation-
wide anti- union hotline for store managers to use if they felt suspicious 
of any errant workers and it put in place a rapid response team, complete 
with its own special corporate jet, committed to taking over a store at 
a moment’s notice when incipient unionization efforts were identified 
(Lichtenstein 2009). At face- value, Wal- Mart’s sectoral expansion into 
food retailing and its geographical expansion into metropolitan areas 
has been a triumph. Up until the time of writing this chapter, not one 
of its workers in the US is represented by a union. And perhaps more 
impressively, 96 per cent of the US population now lives within 20 miles 
of a Wal- Mart store (Zook and Graham 2006: 20). Notwithstanding Wal- 
Mart’s success in expanding its network of stores in union strongholds, 
the company has experienced massive worker desertion rates. By 1999 the 
annual labour turnover reached an astonishing 70 per cent as low- ranking 
employees were buckling under the pressure of harsh work conditions 
and poverty- line wages. The constant need to find replacements was very 
costly for Wal- Mart because of the huge expenses incurred in training new 
employees. Indeed by the early 2000s, it was estimated that Wal- Mart was 
spending $1.4 billion annually to replace the 600 000 to 700 000 workers 
that were leaving the company each year (Hopkins 2007).
Moreover, despite the fact that it has quelled unionization efforts, by 
becoming so ubiquitous within America, Wal- Mart has become subject 
to broader forms of social resistance. Lawsuits against the company have 
offered one avenue of contestation for disgruntled employees. Indeed, by 
2004 Wal- Mart was involved in a total of 8000 ongoing legal cases (Olive 
2004). The cases were launched in regard to a whole gamut of complaints 
such as gender and race discrimination and violation of state and federal 
regulations on overtime, lunch breaks and health and safety. The most 
famous of these was the ‘Duke versus Wal- Mart’ case – the largest class 
action attempt in history, involving 1.6 million female plaintiffs who 
were allegedly discriminated against when working for Wal- Mart. The 
Bentonville giant successfully appealed to the US Supreme Court to 
revoke the class action status of these legal efforts and, in so doing, the 
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company saved itself from the possibility of paying billions of dollars in 
damages. However, Wal- Mart has not been able to avoid all of the legal 
repercussions of its draconian labour practices. To illustrate, in 2008 alone 
Wal- Mart agreed to pay $352 million to settle 63 suits across the US over 
charges that it did not provide its employees with meal breaks and proper 
rest (Seligman 2006; Banjo 2012). The increased employee resistance is 
probably complicating Wal- Mart’s hallmark cost- cutting strategy. As 
Figure 9.2 shows, Wal- Mart’s differential SGA expenses per employee 
have grown since 1999. This uptrend indicates that Wal- Mart may be 
increasingly disinclined to enforce retrenchment on its evermore restive 
workforce.
But skirmishes with Wal- Mart have not only been fought in the 
law courts. They have also been taking place on the streets. Bernstein 
Research, the Wall Street- based investor advisory firm, produced a report 
in 2005 warning shareholders that Wal- Mart’s growth ‘is under siege in 
several regions of the country from growing opposition by local commu-
nities’. The report concluded that the ‘heightened resistance’ could slow 
down the company’s square footage growth rates, which in turn could 
negatively impact Wal- Mart’s stock price and earnings per share (cited by 
Norman 2007).
Community resistance has been most pronounced in the ‘site fights’ 
headed by local activists and labour unions who have sought to lobby 
local and municipal governments to change zoning and land- use laws so 
as to thwart Wal- Mart’s planned store openings. When viewed on a case- 
by- case basis, these grassroots mobilizations can be derided as exhibiting 
little more than ‘not- in- my- back- yard’ parochialism. However, when 
considered on a nationwide level these local struggles appear to be part of 
a sustained and expansive movement of resistance against Wal- Mart. The 
site fight phenomenon climaxed in 2008, when 70 of Wal- Mart’s planned 
store openings were blocked or postponed. Given the fact that the average 
Wal- Mart store makes over $50 million in annual sales (author’s own 
calculations), each community victory represents a considerable blow to 
the company. Partly in response to the intensified resistance, Wal- Mart 
revised its domestic expansion target in 2007 from 265–70 new super- 
centre openings per year to 170 super- centre openings per year for the 
three following years (Norman 2007).
Yet despite there being fewer new targets for community activists, site 
fights still rage on. In 2012 and 2013, Wal- Mart engaged in a protracted 
battle over plans to open a new store in Los Angeles’ historic Chinatown. 
In late June 2012, thousands of Angelinos – ranging from union organ-
izers to Chinese owners of small family- run shops – joined together in 
the largest anti- Wal- Mart march to date, to express their opposition to 
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the slated store opening. Although Wal- Mart eventually prevailed in this 
struggle, the protests against Wal- Mart’s incursion into downtown LA are 
illustrative of the latent resistance that the company now faces in parts of 
the US that lie beyond the retailer’s imperium.
To make matters worse for Wal- Mart, there has been a recent upsurge 
in struggles waged by employees working directly for the company. In 
October 2012, over seventy Wal- Mart retail clerks engaged in walkouts 
in Los Angeles. The strike – the first ever by retail workers in Wal- Mart’s 
history – spread to 28 Wal- Mart stores in 12 different states. These actions 
were taken because Wal- Mart allegedly harassed and cut the hours of 
workers who became affiliated to OUR Wal- Mart (Organization United 
for Respect at Wal- Mart), a non- union campaign group supported by 
UFCW that seeks better pay, more affordable healthcare and improved 
working conditions for Wal- Mart workers (cf. www.forrespect.org). On 
Black Friday, the day that follows American Thanksgiving and the busiest 
shopping date of the year, Wal- Mart workers rose up again, with over 
1000 individual actions and strikes reportedly taking place in over one 
hundred cities (Hines and Miles 2012). But in spite of the unrest, Wal- 
Mart triumphantly declared that it was their most successful Black Friday 
ever. Among other things, 1.8 million towels, 1.3 million dolls and 1.2 
million televisions were sold by the company within just 24 hours (Wohl 
2012).
One day later, 112 workers died in a fire in a cramped garment factory 
owned by one of Wal- Mart’s suppliers in Bangladesh. Such is the strange, 
global algebra of everyday low prices, with rabid consumption on one 
end of the equation and inhuman labour conditions on the other. On the 
Sunday of that week, thousands took to the streets of Dhaka, the capital 
of Bangladesh, to protest against the lax health and safety standards that 
precipitated the factory inferno. And on the Monday, Wal- Mart sheep-
ishly announced that it was severing ties with the supplier that owned 
the factory (Chalmers 2012). This episode points to the broader issue 
of whether Wal- Mart might be encountering the social limits of its cost- 
cutting model, not only within its own stores, but within the supply chains 
that furnish these stores with cheap commodities.
WAL- MART EXPANDS ABROAD
To summarize the argument so far, Wal- Mart’s expansion in the American 
retail market has been slowing down in part because of intensified social 
resistance. In the face of this problem, Wal- Mart increasingly turned to 
international expansion as a means of augmenting its earnings growth. 
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Figure 9.3 Wal- Mart’s would- be retail empire 2012
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Figure 9.3 depicts Wal- Mart’s would- be retail empire. The company has 
a presence in the countries shaded in grey and it has withdrawn from the 
countries shaded in black. The data- labels indicate the number of stores 
Wal- Mart has in each national territory.
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Figure 9.4 Wal- Mart’s store count in the US and abroad
162  Handbook of the international political economy of production
While Figure 9.3 shows the spatial configuration of Wal- Mart’s inter-
national division, Figure 9.4 shows how it has developed through time. 
More specifically, it presents the changes in Wal- Mart’s store numbers 
within the US market, mature markets abroad and emerging markets. 
The chart confirms that Wal- Mart sought to break the ‘national envelope’ 
once opportunities to expand in the US domestic retail market began to 
dwindle (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 390). Indeed, just when Wal- Mart’s 
long arc of growth in the US began to flatten in the mid- 1990s it started 
to extend its pecuniary ambit elsewhere. Additionally, the chart shows 
that while Wal- Mart experienced very rapid expansion in foreign markets 
in the early years of its internationalization, the rate of store growth has 
slowed down somewhat since the turn of the twenty- first century. Two 
other proxies for Wal- Mart’s internationalization are presented in the 
insert of Figure 9.4: the share of the company’s total sales and the share 
of its total operating income garnered by its international division. These 
are admittedly imperfect measures given the vicissitudes of international 
exchange rates and transfer pricing; however, it still might be worth noting 
that although the majority of Wal- Mart’s stores are outside of the US, 
the company’s foreign operations account for only 29 per cent of its total 
sales and 23 per cent of its operating income. This gap between the share 
of total sales and the share of total operating income held by Wal- Mart’s 
international division suggests that the company’s US business continues 
to be more profitable than its operations abroad.
How do we account for the overall performance of Wal- Mart’s interna-
tional division? One can see from Figure 9.4 that the growth in Wal- Mart’s 
store numbers in mature foreign markets has tapered off since the mid- 
2000s. This trend suggests that the group of advanced capitalist countries 
that Wal- Mart has entered only offer a limited outlet for Wal- Mart’s 
expansion. Indeed, among the mature consumer markets, Wal- Mart has 
attained unalloyed success in just two countries: the UK and Canada. As 
the UK and Canada have social compacts and cultural heritages that are 
comparable to that of the US, it is perhaps no surprise that their respective 
human resources complexes have been broadly receptive to the ‘Wal- Mart 
Way’. However, even in these two countries Wal- Mart has encountered 
pockets of resistance. In the French- speaking province of Quebec, the 
norms of the Anglosphere, or what Kees van der Pijl calls the ‘Lockean 
heartland’ (1998: 65), have not permeated so deeply into the social fabric. 
Perhaps partly as a result, Quebecois workers were at the forefront of the 
Canadian labour struggle for unionization in Wal- Mart stores in the early 
to mid- 2000s. When one Wal- Mart store in rural Quebec was success-
fully unionized, Wal- Mart quickly responded by closing the store down. 
Similarly, when Wal- Mart acquired the British supermarket giant Asda in 
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1999, it got embroiled in a battle with a union representing one quarter of 
the employees working at Asda’s distribution centres (Tilly 2007). After 
a protracted struggle, Wal- Mart ceded substantial organizing rights to 
the union. As such, given the residual worker resistance in the UK and 
Canada, and given their saturated retail markets, it appears that the 
Anglosphere only offers a temporary outlet for Wal- Mart’s international 
growth.
Outside of the Lockean heartland, Wal- Mart has encountered even 
more pronounced worker resistance. Most notably, Wal- Mart’s attempts 
at penetrating the German retail market ended in ignominious defeat. 
In the eight years that Wal- Mart did business in Germany it lost around 
$200 million annually and it cost the company one billion dollars to finally 
divest itself of its operations in the country in 2006.
What explains the failure of Wal- Mart’s operations in Germany? For 
one thing, the Bentonville giant was hamstrung by Germany’s restrictive 
land use regulations and strict store- hour regulations – a legacy of the 
Mittelstand’s successful mobilization against big retailers in the 1950s. 
These spatial and temporal limitations made it difficult for Wal- Mart to 
differentiate itself from its competitors with its low- cost, out- of- town box 
store expansion strategy that it honed in the US (Christopherson 2006; 
2007). And perhaps more importantly, Wal- Mart had immense problems 
managing its German workforce. Although Germany has undergone dra-
matic changes in recent decades which have shifted the balance of power 
away from labour towards capital, the institutions that undergird a col-
laborative and coordinated system of engagement between workers and 
management remain partly intact. Moreover, the Bismarckian, insurance- 
based features of the German welfare system militated against Wal- Mart’s 
preferred practice of shifting the costs of employee social reproduction 
to the public sector at large. This clash between Wal- Mart’s disciplinary 
labour practices and prevailing social norms in Germany was cast in 
sharp relief when the retail behemoth attempted to introduce its employee 
code of conduct in the country. This code formed the core of Wal- Mart’s 
private labour regulations and was a key tool for workplace discipline in 
the US. Among other things, the code forbade flirtation between Wal- 
Mart workers. Such overbearing and intrusive rules were widely taken to 
be an affront to retail workers’ autonomy. Amid growing worker disdain 
for Wal- Mart’s strictures, a German Labour Court struck down many 
features of the code. In short, the hierarchical relation that Wal- Mart 
prided itself in having with workers in the US did not meld well with 
the dilapidated, but nonetheless deeply embedded structures of German 
 corporatism (Backer 2007).
Given the marked slowdown in Wal- Mart’s expansion in mature 
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markets, emerging markets appear to offer the greatest possibilities 
for the company’s future accumulation. Of these ventures in emerging 
markets, Wal- Mart’s Mexican operations have been by far the most suc-
cessful. Like Wal- Mart’s Canadian operations, Wal- Mart’s venture in 
Mexico has benefited from the fact that the country borders the US and 
can thus draw on the extension of the company’s pre- existing US supply 
chain infrastructure. Since 2003 Wal- Mart has been the largest private 
employer in Mexico, with well over 200 000 people currently on its payroll. 
However, Wal- Mart has been less successful in other emerging markets. 
For example, in China – the largest emerging market of all – Wal- Mart has 
been experiencing major problems. Aware of the importance of China’s 
burgeoning middle class for its own international sales drive, Wal- Mart’s 
directors have assiduously sought to forge linkages with the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). In the early to mid- 2000s, the then CEO of Wal- 
Mart, Lee Scott, went on five visits to China to meet high- ranking govern-
ment officials, including the then president of the country, Jiang Zemin. 
Notwithstanding these overtures, the Chinese government and Wal- Mart 
have differed in their views on the extent and pace of liberalization in the 
country’s retail sector.
Government- led resistance to Wal- Mart’s expanding presence in the 
country’s retail landscape was clear to see in 2004, when the ruling 
Communist Party’s ostensible organ of labour representation, the All 
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACTFU), threatened to take Wal- 
Mart to court if it did not allow the formation of a workers’ union for its 
stores. ACTFU then launched a unionization drive amongst Wal- Mart 
workers. The company caved in and accepted ACFTU’s demands. The 
significance of this episode lies in the fact that by getting Wal- Mart stores 
unionized, the Chinese government could install intelligence- gathering 
capabilities within the company itself. Given the size of the potential retail 
market in China, Wal- Mart of course could not refuse this measure, but it 
did represent a defeat for the company (Wang and Zhang 2006).
Clearly, there is much work that still needs to be done to harmonize the 
operations of Wal- Mart’s retail segment with the agenda of the Chinese 
government. Partly as a result of the disjuncture between the machinations 
of Wal- Mart and the priorities of the CCP, the retail giant’s sales growth 
in the country still lags behind many of China’s domestic supermarkets 
(Chuang et al. 2011). If Wal- Mart is to close the gap with its rivals in 
China, it will probably need to continue to attain prime real estate in the 
saturated property markets of major cities such as Shanghai through the 
process of acquisition. But so far, Wal- Mart’s experience has shown that 
this approach to penetrating metropolitan areas is tough and often pro-
tracted (Tacconelli and Wrigley 2009). Taken as a whole, the prospects 
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for Wal- Mart in the world’s largest emerging retail market are shrouded 
in uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
Wal- Mart’s pecuniary success has been based on a reinvestment strategy 
of rapid greenfield growth and rigid control over workers throughout its 
supply chain. In the first two decades of its existence, Wal- Mart could 
grow largely ‘under the radar’ of organized labour. It expanded at a dra-
matic pace in the relatively un- unionized and hence uncontested retail 
landscape of the south- east and midwest. Moreover, although it was not 
the first major retailer to source goods from East Asia, by the 1990s it 
had the largest network of suppliers in the region (Gereffi and Christian 
2009). And whilst the development of the back- end of Wal- Mart’s supply 
chain has not figured prominently in this analysis, it has been integral to 
the company’s differential accumulation trajectory. Wal- Mart’s suppliers 
filled their sweatshops with masses of underpaid female workers who had 
migrated from rural areas, just as Wal- Mart had filled its own stores with 
underpaid female retail clerks who had been displaced by agricultural 
transformations within the US. The success of this explicitly gendered 
nexus of corporate power is undeniable. Perhaps no other firm in history 
has harnessed the energies of feminized labour more effectively and on 
such a colossal scale.
However, the retail behemoth has become increasingly encumbered. 
As Wal- Mart expanded into the metropolitan areas of the north- east and 
the far west in the 1990s, the company found it harder to apply its distinct 
model of retailing, because in these parts of the US unions are more active 
and municipal zoning rules are more heavily contested. As such, soon after 
Wal- Mart moved into these areas it became subject to increased resist-
ance. Now Wal- Mart’s model of lean retailing is facing stern opposition at 
all levels of its supply chain: from its workers involved in the OUR Wal- 
Mart campaign and from the suppliers’ employees who at times are engag-
ing in a life and death struggle for humane work conditions. Moreover, 
as the data in this chapter indicate, the internationalization efforts have 
failed to increase the company’s differential capitalization and differential 
profits. In fact, in 2012 Wal- Mart announced that it would cut store open-
ings for its international division by an astounding 30 per cent (Jopson 
2012). The massive downsizing of expansion plans was motivated by the 
desire to attain satisfactory levels of profitability and assuage outstanding 
bribery claims made against the company. Bribery allegations first broke 
out after revelations that Wal- Mart bribed government officials in Mexico 
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to expedite zoning approvals and planning permits for its new stores, but 
it now encompasses alleged breaches in US anti- corruption laws in its 
operations in Brazil, China and India. With opportunities for frictionless 
growth characteristic of the first few decades of its existence long gone, 
Wal- Mart seems to have been pushing the limits of legality in its bid to 
expand further (Barstow 2012). If no transformative upsurge in foreign 
investment takes place, Wal- Mart will perhaps experience relative stagna-
tion or even differential decline. In short, the paragon of rapid business 
growth in the late twentieth century may become the exemplar of the limits 
to corporate power in the twenty- first.
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